A fierce power struggle is gripping the top of Iran’s regime, with hardline security figures pushing to escalate the conflict with the United States as questions mount over who is actually wielding authority in the absence of the country’s unseen Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.
Reported by:
Cherry Meigh Timbol
News Content Editor
Published September 14, 2026
Iran’s greatest vulnerability may not be its military position. It may be the question of who is actually in control.
A report highlighted by Breitbart raises an extraordinary possibility: Iran’s leadership is no longer operating as a coherent chain of command, with competing factions capable of pursuing dramatically different strategies without the knowledge of other senior officials. If accurate, the implications extend far beyond Tehran. They could directly affect negotiations with Washington, the security of the Strait of Hormuz, global energy markets, and the possibility of a wider Middle East war.
The reported July attack on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz is particularly revealing. According to the report, President Masoud Pezeshkian, IRGC commander Gen. Ahmad Vahidi and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council were allegedly unaware of the operation beforehand. Investigators subsequently reportedly traced the decision to Hossein Taeb, a powerful hardliner and former IRGC intelligence chief who opposed negotiations with Washington.
That is not simply an internal political disagreement.
It is a command-and-control problem.
A Regime without a clear referee
For decades, Iran’s political system has depended upon the authority of the supreme leader to resolve disputes at the top. But the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the elevation of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, have fundamentally altered that arrangement.
Reuters previously reported that Iran’s wartime power had increasingly shifted toward the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and security leadership, with Mojtaba Khamenei remaining formally at the top while senior commanders exercised substantial influence over strategy and decision-making.
The latest allegations make that situation even more troubling.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not made an authenticated public appearance since suffering severe injuries during the opening strikes of the conflict. Breitbart reports that even senior Iranian officials have questioned whether communications attributed to him are genuine. President Pezeshkian has reportedly struggled to establish whether he is communicating directly with the supreme leader or with an intermediary.
If those allegations are correct, Iran has a problem that is bigger than a disagreement between moderates and hardliners.
The regime may have multiple centers of authority.
And when multiple factions can claim to speak for the supreme leader, diplomacy becomes extraordinarily difficult.
The danger of a faction that wants escalation
The most dangerous faction may be the one that believes negotiations themselves represent a threat to the regime.
According to the reporting, Hossein Taeb and other hardliners opposed the U.S.-Iran memorandum and believed Iran should continue fighting rather than pursue an accommodation with Washington. The reported strategy involved increasing attacks against American targets, threatening U.S. forces, driving up casualties and using Iran-aligned forces in Yemen and Iraq to put additional pressure on American interests and regional infrastructure.
That strategy carries enormous risks.
But it also has a certain logic from the perspective of Tehran’s most uncompromising elements: if Iran can make the economic and military cost of the conflict sufficiently high, perhaps Washington will eventually conclude that continued pressure is not worth the price.
The problem is that this calculation could produce the opposite result.
Instead of forcing Washington to retreat, an attack on American personnel or critical energy infrastructure could trigger a much larger U.S. response.
That is the danger when foreign policy becomes hostage to internal regime politics.
Hormuz is the pressure point
The Strait of Hormuz is where Iran’s internal power struggle becomes a global problem.
The waterway is one of the world’s most important energy corridors, and the latest escalation has already produced consequences far beyond Iran. Reuters reported that Gulf states postponed a planned meeting with Tehran while fighting involving Iran-aligned Houthi forces expanded into Yemen. Oil prices rose more than 3% when markets reopened, while damage to Saudi Arabia’s east-west oil pipeline threatened to remove as much as 4% of global oil supply if the disruption continued.
Iran also issued a list of 77 vessels it said had violated its rules in the Strait, warning that ships could face restrictions, fines, detention or confiscation.
This is why the question of who controls Iran cannot be dismissed as palace intrigue.
A divided government with control over missiles, drones, naval forces and regional proxy networks is inherently unpredictable.
A government that is unified may make dangerous decisions.
A government that is divided can make dangerous decisions accidentally.
The economic clock is also ticking
There is another pressure point that the hardliners cannot easily escape: Iran’s economy.
Even Iranian officials have acknowledged the danger. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has warned that military strength alone cannot sustain the country if ordinary people are hungry and economic activity collapses. Pezeshkian has similarly argued that the war eventually has to end.
That creates a fundamental contradiction inside Tehran.
One faction appears to believe that escalation is the path to survival.
Another appears to understand that continued escalation could destroy the economic foundation necessary for the regime to survive.
Neither side can afford to be seen as surrendering.
That makes diplomacy much harder.
Washington should not assume that every Iranian message comes from the same place
This may be the most important lesson for Washington.
If the reporting is accurate, American policymakers cannot simply assume that a statement attributed to Iran’s supreme leader necessarily represents a unified Iranian policy.
The United States must distinguish between Iran’s formal government, the IRGC, intelligence and security organizations, political leaders, and the various hardline networks operating around them.
That does not mean Washington should abandon negotiations.
It means Washington should understand precisely who has the ability to enforce any agreement.
A deal is only as meaningful as the people capable of implementing it.
If one faction can sabotage an agreement by launching attacks without the approval of the president, military commander or national security council, then a diplomatic document alone will not solve the problem.
