Russian intelligence document calls China ‘the enemy’, leak exposes Moscow’s deep fear

In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a festive reception for foreign leaders attending celebrations of the Victory Day on May 9, 2025. (Photo by Mikhail METZEL / POOL / AFP)(AFP)

| Published June 9, 2025

A leaked FSB document obtained by ‘The New York Times’ reveals Russia sees China as a major intelligence threat, branding it “the enemy.” The report warns of Beijing’s attempts to recruit Russian scientists and spy on military operations.

In a rare and detailed glimpse into the internal operations of Russian intelligence, a leaked document from the Federal Security Service (FSB) outlines a stark and methodical assessment of China’s activities within Russian borders and beyond. The memo, reportedly drafted by an FSB counterintelligence unit, refers to China repeatedly as “the enemy” and lays out a broad framework for identifying and countering espionage and influence campaigns.

Spanning eight pages and dated around late 2023 or early 2024, the document reveals Russia’s internal surveillance strategies, assessments of Chinese intelligence efforts, and a specialized counterintelligence program launched just days before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. While Russia and China publicly maintain strong diplomatic and economic ties, the document presents an unfiltered view of how Moscow’s security apparatus perceives its eastern neighbor behind closed doors.

This report draws directly from the leaked memo’s contents, highlighting its structure, terminology, areas of concern, and operational responses—without drawing broader interpretations.

Inside the FSB Memo Calling China “the Enemy”

1. Context & Document Origin

The internal memo originates from the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia’s main security agency.

Leaked to the New York Times, then reported by outlets including LiveMint.

2. Scope and Format

It is an eight‑page planning document drafted by an FSB unit.

Though undated, context suggests late 2023 or early 2024.

3. FSB’s Internal Labeling of China

China is repeatedly referred to in the memo as **“the enemy.”**

The memo frames China as a direct security threat to Russia.

4. Allegations of Espionage & Intelligence Gathering

Chinese agents are accused of recruiting:

Dissatisfied Russian scientists and intelligence officers.

Russian citizens married to Chinese nationals.

Reports that China monitors Russian military endeavors in Ukraine—studying Western arms and battlefield tactics.

Espionage activities include:

Arctic surveillance via mining firms and university research centers.

Monitoring returnees using polygraphs and control over ~20,000 Russian students in China.

5. Counter‑measures: “Entente‑4” Program

Three days before the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, FSB launched a program called “Entente‑4” to counter Chinese intelligence.

Objectives included:

Focusing counter‑espionage efforts on Russia‑China cooperation channels.

Holding face‑to‑face meetings with individuals working with Chinese entities.

Blocking dissemination of strategic or scientific information.

6. Areas of Concern Highlighted

Scientific & Military Technology

Chinese intelligence allegedly targeting know‑how in drone warfare, aviation systems, and weapon modernization.

Interest noted in ekranoplan specialists and software/control systems.

Territorial Influence & Historical Claims

China reportedly researching “ancient Chinese peoples” in Russia’s Far East.

Use of older Chinese place names in maps, suggesting academic groundwork for future territorial assertions.

Geopolitical Regional Reach

Focus on expanding Chinese presence through soft‑power efforts in Central Asia (e.g., Uzbekistan).

Ongoing Chinese activity in the Arctic, especially around the Northern Sea Route, using mining and university covers.

7. Strategic Dilemma Acknowledged

The memo stresses that Russia remains economically and militarily intertwined with China:

China is Russia’s top oil buyer and supplier of advanced electronics and military components under sanctions.

The FSB advises caution—high‑level approval required before any action that might jeopardize bilateral relations.

8. Ongoing Intelligence Operations

Continuous surveillance of WeChat users with links to Chinese contacts.

FSB reports instruct officers to:

Warn collaborators about Chinese recruitment efforts.

Track communications to preempt potential security leaks.

Visual & Media Support

Key Figures & Actors

FSB unit authors — internal analysts and planners behind the memo.

Russian scientists/intelligence personnel — identified as vulnerable to recruitment.

Chinese intelligence operatives — alleged recruiters and information gatherers.

Russian authorities — involved in oversight and approval of counter‑measures.

Geographic Locations Mentioned

Russian Far East — focus of historical/territorial research.

Ukraine — site of observed military operations.

Arctic & Northern Sea Route — areas studied for economic and strategic purposes.

Central Asia — spotted as a target of soft‑power efforts.

China (mainland) — home to students, returnees, and recruitment centers.

Timeline Overview

Period Event

Late 2023–early 2024 Drafting of classified FSB memo.
Feb 2022 Launch of Entente‑4 counterintelligence program.
Post-2022 invasion Increased Chinese presence in military, scientific, and Arctic sectors.

Document Structure & Tone

Format: eight pages, labeled as a planning document.

Tone: internally urgent and cautious—refers to China as “the enemy” and repeatedly warns of risks.

Contains explicit instructions for FSB field officers—deploy surveillance, engage in-person, and seek approval before taking action.

Deeper Breakdown of the FSB Memo

1. Internal Language and Terminology

The memo consistently refers to China as “the enemy”—a term used in multiple sections.

This label appears in the context of threat assessments, surveillance planning, and internal counterintelligence briefings.

2. “Entente‑4” Program Details

Launched: February 21, 2022—three days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Purpose: Serve as a structured response to perceived Chinese espionage.

Directives include:

Prioritizing Chinese-linked activity in counterintelligence agendas.

Identifying potential security leaks in joint scientific and academic programs.

Requiring higher-level authorization before taking actions that could affect Russia-China diplomacy.

3. Surveillance and Monitoring Tactics

The FSB instructed regional units to:

Conduct in-person interviews with Russians affiliated with Chinese institutions.

Monitor online communications involving Chinese applications (e.g., WeChat).

Apply polygraph testing to Russian citizens returning from long-term stays in China.

Track movements of Chinese nationals in research, mining, and educational sectors.

4. Priority Intelligence Targets

Scientific and Technological Experts:

Ekranoplan engineers (wing-in-ground-effect aircraft specialists).

Software developers tied to Russian military contractors.

Drone warfare researchers and defense logistics personnel.

Strategic Sectors under Review:

Joint mining operations in the Arctic and Far East.

Academic exchange programs, particularly at universities specializing in natural sciences or military technologies.

5. Noted Chinese Intelligence Methods

Recruitment Patterns:

Focus on individuals with dual affiliations, such as Russian scientists with Chinese spouses.

Use of long-term academic partnerships to establish influence.

Information Extraction Techniques:

Collecting open-source data through academic research.

Exploiting non-sensitive but strategic information in transportation and infrastructure.

6. Geographic Sensitivities

Russian Far East:

The FSB reported increased Chinese interest in historical narratives.

Chinese research projects allegedly used ancient ethnic references and toponyms.

Arctic Region:

Surveillance of Chinese geological surveys and infrastructure investments.

Focus on access points along the Northern Sea Route.

Central Asia:

Tracking of Chinese cultural and financial presence in post-Soviet states.

Monitoring of Russian allies cooperating with Beijing on transport corridors and pipelines.

7. Operational Cautions and Diplomatic Limits

Memo includes a note of restraint: All operations involving Chinese nationals or entities require approval from higher levels of the FSB chain of command.

Officers were reminded to balance intelligence work with the “current geopolitical climate” and “strategic dependencies.”

8. Case Examples & Specific Concerns

Polygraph Screening Initiative:

Focused on individuals returning from Chinese government-sponsored scholarships or tech-sector work placements.

Export Technology Leakage:

Concerns over microelectronics and aviation subsystem designs being transferred via joint ventures.

Data Gathering via Universities:

Russian institutions were instructed to report Chinese collaborations, especially in AI, quantum computing, and materials science.

Implications of the FSB Memo Leak

1. Internal Contradiction in Russia–China Relations

While the Kremlin publicly promotes a strong strategic partnership with Beijing, the FSB memo reveals deep institutional distrust within Russia’s security establishment.

This divergence suggests a dual-track policy: outward cooperation alongside internal containment.

2. Shift in Russian Strategic Priorities

The explicit labeling of China as “the enemy” marks a notable pivot from the traditional threat hierarchy dominated by the West, particularly the U.S. and NATO.

This shift may reflect growing concern over asymmetric influence, especially in Siberia, the Arctic, and academia.

3. Fragility of Post-Sanctions Alliances

The memo underscores the dependence–suspicion paradox: Russia increasingly relies on China for economic and military support, even as it views Beijing as a long-term threat.

This dynamic weakens the perception of a truly stable anti-Western bloc and may indicate vulnerabilities in Russia’s sanctions-era foreign policy.

4. Erosion of Trust in People-to-People Diplomacy

Programs once seen as soft-power bridges—such as student exchanges, academic research, and commercial joint ventures—are now recast as potential infiltration channels.

This view could hinder scientific progress and degrade mutual cultural understanding, even as official relations remain warm.

5. Escalation of Surveillance Infrastructure

The directives in the memo point to an expansion of domestic surveillance, especially targeting Russians with Chinese contacts.

Tools like polygraphs, chat app monitoring, and travel profiling reflect a militarized intelligence culture increasingly wary of internal dissent or leakage.

6. Arctic and Far East Geopolitical Flashpoints

Chinese research activities in the Russian Far East and Arctic—described in the memo as suspicious—indicate possible future territorial or economic friction zones.

These regions are key to Russia’s long-term energy strategy and are becoming more contested as climate change opens new access routes.

7. Precedent for Counterintelligence Framing

The memo may set a new precedent inside the FSB for handling strategic partners as potential adversaries.

If adopted more broadly, this mindset could reshape Russia’s intelligence doctrine not just for China, but for other allies with expanding global ambitions (e.g., India, Turkey, Iran).

8. Risk of Diplomatic Fallout

Though the document is unofficial and not acknowledged publicly, its leak may cause diplomatic tension, particularly if Beijing sees it as evidence of bad faith or internal hostility.

This could complicate joint projects like the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, regional infrastructure, or arms development cooperation.

Overall Takeaway:

The leaked FSB memo provides a rare and candid window into Russia’s internal security worldview—one that diverges sharply from its official diplomacy. Despite outward displays of alliance and mutual support, Russian intelligence considers China a strategic threat and actively works to counter its influence across scientific, military, and territorial domains.

This document reveals a Russia caught between strategic necessity and institutional suspicion: economically reliant on Beijing, yet deeply wary of its intentions. It suggests that beneath the public façade of partnership lies a more complex, competitive, and potentially unstable dynamic—one shaped not just by ideology or economics, but by long-term fears of encroachment, espionage, and geopolitical displacement.