| Published July, 2025
In a blistering op-ed that sent shockwaves through Brussels, EUObserver journalist Andrew Rettman ignited fierce controversy by urging the European Union to “crush” Hungary and Slovakia after the two member states vetoed a new round of Russia sanctions. Labeling their leaders as “Kremlin shills” and “traitors,” Rettman’s incendiary call for legal, financial, and even intelligence-based retaliation exposed deep fractures within the EU—and raised urgent questions about the bloc’s tolerance for dissent, national sovereignty, and the growing authoritarian tone of its most loyal defenders.
🧩 1. The Context: Sanctions Block at EU Summit
At the heart of the controversy is the June 26–27, 2025 EU Council Summit in Brussels, where Hungary and Slovakia vetoed the EU’s 18th sanctions package targeting Russian energy exports. The proposed measures aimed to further restrict oil and gas revenues flowing to Moscow amid its ongoing war in Ukraine.
However, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico raised serious concerns about the fallout such sanctions could have on their own countries’ energy security. Both nations still rely heavily on Russian gas and oil, and they argued that new restrictions—without tailored exemptions or guarantees—could cripple their economies.
Despite harsh criticism from EU leaders and media outlets, both governments stood firm. They emphasized that they had supported previous sanctions (packages 1–17), but that this latest set crossed a line by failing to protect member states’ vital interests. Their veto blocked unanimous approval, a requirement for EU foreign policy decisions.
The move exposed deep divisions within the EU: between hawkish Western countries pushing maximal pressure on Russia, and Central European nations prioritizing survival over symbolism. The veto also raised alarms in Brussels about the limits of unity and the risk of “sanctions fatigue” fracturing the EU’s stance on Ukraine.
🗯️ 2. What Rettman Said — and Why It Matters
In a fiery op-ed published by EUObserver on June 30, 2025, Brussels-based journalist Andrew Rettman lashed out at Hungary and Slovakia for blocking the EU’s latest sanctions against Russia. But what made his commentary explosive wasn’t just his frustration — it was his unapologetically extreme rhetoric and the raw contempt he directed at two democratically elected governments.
Rettman branded Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovak leader Robert Fico as “Kremlin shills” and accused them of siding with Putin against the European Union. He dismissed their national security concerns as excuses and demanded that the EU stop treating these governments with kid gloves. Instead, he argued, it was time to “crush them” using every tool available — political, legal, financial, and even covert.
Among Rettman’s suggestions:
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Freeze EU funds destined for Hungary and Slovakia
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Launch intelligence operations to expose internal vulnerabilities
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Use audits and investigations as pressure tactics
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Publicly shame their leaders
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Sabotage their participation in Schengen travel rights
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Mobilize civil society and NGOs to destabilize their domestic credibility
His most provocative line? “If these two little traitors want a war with the EU — let’s give them one.” That statement didn’t just raise eyebrows — it crossed a line many observers considered incendiary and authoritarian.
The fact that such a piece appeared in a mainstream, EU-aligned outlet like EUObserver gave it weight far beyond an angry blog post. It revealed a growing intolerance in Brussels toward dissent within the union, especially when that dissent interferes with foreign policy orthodoxy. Rettman’s rhetoric, though not official EU policy, mirrors the sentiment of pro-Brussels elites who see Orbán and Fico as obstacles to a unified European front — not just on Russia, but on broader issues like migration, judicial independence, and national sovereignty.
📣 3. Strong Words, Broad Backing?
Andrew Rettman’s scorched-earth op-ed didn’t come out of nowhere—but its aggressive tone and calls for institutional retaliation shocked many even within the pro-EU camp. His suggestion to treat Hungary and Slovakia as enemies from within was one of the most extreme public arguments ever made from inside the Brussels-aligned media establishment.
While EUObserver often promotes federalist and integrationist views, Rettman’s demand for an all-out political war against two member states crossed the line from advocacy to intimidation. Yet disturbingly, his article didn’t remain isolated. It struck a nerve among hardline eurocrats, left-wing politicians, and think tank voices who have long been frustrated by Orbán’s and Fico’s resistance to Brussels on issues like migration, LGBTQ+ policies, press freedom, and now — Russia sanctions.
Some insiders reportedly echoed Rettman’s frustration, though not all embraced his full “crush them” strategy. The underlying idea — that Hungary and Slovakia should face consequences for bucking the EU consensus — is gaining traction quietly within Brussels policy circles. Tools like the conditionality mechanism (which ties EU funds to “rule of law” standards) or Article 7 (which can suspend a member’s voting rights) have already been floated against Hungary in the past. Rettman’s op-ed merely took these tactics and laid them bare, unapologetically.
However, not everyone is on board. More moderate EU figures and legal scholars have warned that Rettman’s approach risks delegitimizing the EU’s democratic foundations, which are supposed to protect minority positions and national sovereignty. Critics argue that punishing countries for exercising treaty-based rights—like veto power—would turn the EU into a coercive political machine, not a union of equals.
Moreover, public support across Central and Eastern Europe for Brussels-style punishment is thin. Even among EU loyalists, covert ops, fund freezes, and public shaming campaigns are seen by many citizens as elite overreach — reinforcing the populist narrative that the EU no longer serves the people, but polices them.
In short, Rettman’s rhetoric may reflect the mood of an angry elite, but it also highlights a dangerous drift: from persuasion to coercion, and from union to domination.
🏛️ 4. National Interest vs. Brussels Authority
At the core of the conflict lies a fundamental clash of priorities: Hungary and Slovakia are asserting their sovereign right to protect national interests—especially energy security—while Brussels insists on unwavering unity behind a collective foreign policy.
Both Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary and Prime Minister Robert Fico of Slovakia have defended their veto of the EU’s 18th Russia sanctions package as a rational, interest-based decision, not ideological defiance. Hungary, for example, still receives a significant portion of its oil and gas through Russian pipelines. Slovakia depends heavily on Russian supplies for industry and heating. Cutting those ties without a secure, affordable alternative could trigger economic hardship, energy shortages, or even civil unrest.
They argue that the EU’s new sanctions package fails to offer sufficient guarantees or exemptions that would shield their populations from harm. In fact, both countries had supported all 17 previous sanctions rounds, making this veto a measured and specific objection, not a blanket rejection of the EU’s stance on Russia. For them, this is about pragmatism, not Putin.
However, for many in Brussels, any disruption to the EU’s unified front—especially on Ukraine—is seen as a threat. Critics in the European Commission and European Parliament have framed the vetoes as “sabotage,” accusing Hungary and Slovakia of undermining EU credibility on the global stage and giving Moscow a political victory.
This reveals a growing tension: Is the EU still a coalition of sovereign nations cooperating freely, or is it evolving into a centralized bloc where dissent is punished and national governments must fall in line?
Orbán has long warned of a “Brussels superstate” overriding national will, and this crisis only fuels that argument. Fico, similarly, has said Slovakia will not be bullied into decisions that could harm its economy or sovereignty.
In this battle, veto power—a foundational element of EU decision-making—has become the flashpoint. What was once seen as a vital check-and-balance is now being labeled a weapon of obstruction. If Brussels begins moving toward qualified majority voting in foreign policy—a step already hinted at by some leaders—this standoff could mark the beginning of a much larger restructuring of EU governance.
For Hungary and Slovakia, standing their ground isn’t just about sanctions—it’s about preserving the last levers of independence within an increasingly forceful union.
🔮 5. Possible Paths Forward
With tensions at a boiling point and EU unity strained, the bloc faces a difficult crossroads: how to maintain a strong stance against Russia without fracturing internally—or further alienating Hungary and Slovakia.
Here are the key paths Brussels might consider:
🕊️ Diplomatic Compromise
The EU could pursue a face-saving negotiation by offering Hungary and Slovakia tailored energy security guarantees, such as temporary exemptions, long-term transition support, or emergency supply agreements. This strategy has worked in the past—for example, when Hungary received carve-outs during earlier oil embargo talks. It would preserve unity without forcing Orbán and Fico into a corner, and reaffirm diplomacy over coercion.
🧾 Legal Workarounds
One option being explored in Brussels is revisiting qualified majority voting (QMV) in certain areas of foreign policy, particularly sanctions. Under QMV, unanimous approval is no longer needed—removing veto power from individual states. While this would require treaty changes or legal reinterpretations, some EU officials argue it’s time to “modernize” decision-making to prevent future deadlocks. However, this could provoke backlash from smaller states fearing marginalization.
💸 Financial Pressure and Sanctioned Isolation
If negotiations fail, the EU could escalate using existing tools like the conditionality mechanism, which ties access to EU funds to rule-of-law compliance. Hungary has already had billions in cohesion funds frozen under this mechanism. Expanding this tool—or using EU budget leverage—could force Orbán and Fico to relent, but it risks deepening the rift and fueling anti-Brussels sentiment at home.
🕵️ Covert or Political Pressure
As suggested in Rettman’s op-ed, more aggressive forces within the EU sphere may quietly support intelligence operations, public smear campaigns, NGO pressure, and coordinated diplomatic isolation. While unofficial and legally murky, these tactics have precedent in past conflicts with nationalist governments. However, pursuing such moves would invite criticism that the EU is abandoning its democratic values in favor of Machiavellian political warfare.
⚠️ Let the Veto Stand—With Consequences
Another possibility is that the EU simply accepts the veto for now, allowing the 17th sanctions package to continue while freezing progress on the 18th. This would send a message of restraint, but risks signaling weakness to Russia and setting a precedent that veto power can derail major initiatives indefinitely.
🧭 The Stakes
Each path comes with trade-offs. Overreaching could fracture the EU internally. Backing down could embolden future veto threats. The challenge is striking a balance between unity and sovereignty, between principle and pragmatism.
Whether Brussels chooses pressure, persuasion, or reform, the outcome of this standoff may redefine the future of EU governance—and determine whether national interest can still coexist with supranational ambition.
⚖️ Implications: EU Unity Tested, Sovereignty Under Fire
Rettman’s tirade—and the support it’s receiving in some elite EU circles—signals a dangerous shift from consensus-building to coercion within the European Union. If calls to “crush” dissenting nations like Hungary and Slovakia gain traction, it could erode the foundational principle of equal voice among member states. Smaller nations may fear retaliation for acting in their national interest, especially on high-stakes issues like energy security.
Moreover, pushing legal warfare, surveillance, and financial penalties against veto-wielding countries could deepen Euroskeptic sentiment and fuel populist movements. In Hungary and Slovakia, the backlash has already begun, with pro-sovereignty leaders warning of an overreaching Brussels acting more like an imperial center than a union of equals.
Internationally, the dispute may signal to adversaries—especially Russia—that the EU’s unity is fragile and conditional. The spectacle of internal threats, smear campaigns, and proposals for economic punishment may weaken the West’s posture at a time when strategic coherence is vital.
Overall Takeaway: If the EU Is at War with Sovereignty, Hungary and Slovakia Must Stand Their Ground
When unelected bureaucrats and ideological journalists call for war—not against foreign enemies, but against fellow EU member states—it’s clear the globalist regime feels threatened. Hungary and Slovakia aren’t betraying the EU; they are exposing it. By defending their right to veto, to negotiate, and to prioritize national survival over blind obedience, these nations are upholding the very democratic principles Brussels claims to protect.
If the EU insists on punishing independence and silencing dissent, then it’s not Hungary and Slovakia that need to change—it’s the EU that needs to wake up.
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